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Intergovemmental Fiscal Relations
in DevelopingCountries
Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn

The financingand managementproblemsofmany of
T the largest cities in developingcountries have begun to attract the serious attention of economists.
Several factors explain why these issues have been so
long ignored: the traditional concerns of development
economists have been macro growth models and the
agricultural sector; the urban fiscalproblemwas small
in relation to the financialproblemsof the central government; aid donors dealt with central governments;
the fiscal data of local governmentswere scanty; and
troublesomelocal governmentissues seemedbetter left
to administrativespecialists.Things havechanged, primarilybecausethe fiscalproblemsofcities havebecome
national concerns and becausedonors haverecognized
that the success of capital projects in urban areas is
closelytied to the ability of local governmentsto meet
recurrent cost obligations.
This chapter addresses an increasingly important
aspect of urbanization in developingcountries-the
problemsand practicesofurban governmentfinances.It
identifiesand analyzesthe most important pressureson
local budgets, suggests major options for reforms, and
sets out constraints on improvements.An important
limitation to this effortis the inadequacyof comparable
data, as reflectedby the paucityof empiricalsupportfor
these arguments.'

creasedproductivityassociatedwith it. It followsthat if
cities are unable to finance services, maintain their
infrastructure, or accommodatepopulationgrowth,national economicgrowth will be slowed.Second, there
is increasing concern about the problemsof the urban
poor and the need to providethem with improvedliving
conditions. Water, sewerage,primary education, and
refuse collection are locallyprovidedservicesto which
the urban poor often do not have adequateaccess.Important related problemsconcern issues of how to allocate more resources to the provisionof such services,
how to distribute a fair share to the urban poor, and
whether and how to charge recipientsfor their use of
these services.
Third, the resource mobilization issue has assumed
growing importance. In most developingcountries the
share of GNP that is mobilizedfor total public sector
activities is thought to be too low, and local governments may contribute measurablyto increasing it. Urbanizationgenerates increases in taxablecapacity that
can sometimesbe more easily reachedby local than by
central governments. Increases in property values can
be captured by property taxes and growing business
activitiesby business taxes. Some expansionsin formal
employmentcan be more easilytapped by localthan by
central income taxes, and automobile-relatedcharges
might be effectivelyleviedby local governments.With
respectto the provisionof certainservices,such aswater
supply,sewerage,and transport, there is a substantial
opportunity for local governments to recapture costs
through user charges. It would seem reasonable to
assumethat increasingthe mobilizationof localgovernment resourcescouldhavea significanteffecton national tax effort.
Fourth, external lendershavebegun to recognizethe

Urban Government Finance
as a National Problem
That the financial health of cities is an important
national issuefor developingcountries is borneout byat
least fiveconsiderations.First, economicgrowth at the
national level is often led by urbanization and the in124
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importanceofstrengtheninglocalgovernmentfinances.
Capitalprojectshaveannual operatingand maintenance
costs, and in some casesthe supportingservicesmust be
provided. For example, a sites and services housing
project must have a water and sewer system, adequate
refusecollection,street lighting,road maintenance,and
accessto primary educationservices.In many cases the
provision of these services lies with the local government, and therefore the success of the entire project
depends on the abilityof local governmentto meet the
necessaryrecurrent costs.
Finally,questionshavebeen raised about the optimal
distribution of city size. Some have argued that cities
have become too large, that the resulting fiscal and
management problems are insurmountable, and that
centralization of population and economic activity is
somehowbad for economicdevelopment.Others have
countered by noting that productivityadvantagesare
associated with city growth and that effectiveurban
management is possiblewith the correct institutional
framework.Nevertheless,a decentralizationmovement
is under way in many developingcountries to increase
the fiscalautonomyof local governmentsand to bring
government decisionmakingcloser to the people.
The Urban Fiscal Gap
Urban governments in developingand developed
countries alike complain that their resources are inadequateforprovidingsufficienturban services.Thegap
betweenperceivedserviceneedsand financialresources
(the "fiscal gap") has been interpreted in severalways.
The most common explanationbeginswith the observation that urban populations in developingcountries
have expandedrapidlyin recent years and are likelyto
continue expanding in the foreseeablefuture (World
Bank 1979). Urbanizationhas led to rapid increasesin
expenditure requirements, but revenues have not increasedcommensuratelybecauselocal govemmentsare
often restricted to income-inelasticrevenue sources.
A better understanding of the nature of the problem
and the altemative reform possibilitiesrequires some
understanding of the componentsand determinantsof.
the fiscalgap. Auseful starting point may be to cast the
problem in terms of a set of identities that define the
expenditure requirements and revenue constraints of
urban authorities. Expenditureneeds or requirements
for the ith public service in a particular city may be
defined as:
(10-1)

Ei Qi

A

A

I= pP = ei4zP
Qi P
where ,i is the required expenditurefor service i, Qi
-
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is the quantityof servicei required,P is population,ei is
EiliQ, the unit cost of the required service, and ti is
QiIP, quantityof servicei required for each inhabitant.
The actual levelof expendituresfor publicservice,Ei,
may be definedas
E Q
(10-2)
Ei= -'P= eiqiP
QiP
where Qi is the quantity of servicei actuallyprovided.
Local government revenues,R, may be definedas
R=T+C+G
(10-3)
where T is taxes, C is user charges and other current
revenues,and G is externallyraised revenues.
The fiscalgap, D, in a city may then be definedas
(10-4)
D=
i - R = Y (ei4iP)-R
i
E
By contrast, the actual budgetarydeficit,D, is
(10-5)
D = Ei - R = Y (eiqiP)-R.
i
E
This formulationclarifiesthe distinctionbetweenthe
fiscalgap, which reflectsthe shortage of revenue available to providerequired services,and the budget deficit,
which reflects the actual shortfall of revenues.Budget
deficitsdo not alwaysoccur, but fiscalgapsare commonplace. Equations 10-1 through 10-5 are also useful in
organizing the discussionof urban fiscalproblems by
focusing separately on the expenditure and revenue
sides of the local government budget.
Expenditure Pressures
The expenditureside of the localbudget is subject to
two sets of pressures: demandor needswhich raiseQi,
and cost factorswhich raise ei. Much has been written
about howthese factorsaffectexpendituresin developed
countries (Bahl,Johnson,andWasylenko1980),but less
attention has been paidto expendituredeterminantsin
developingcountries. One might ask whether the decisionmaking model used to explain urban fiscal outcomes in advancedcountries fitsthe developing-country
experience.
The advanced-countrymodel of expenditure determination holds that the fiscalchoicesof politiciansare
influencedby the preferencesof the median voter, the
relativeprices of public goods and services,the income
level of the community, and the availabilityof external
resources. The developing-countrycaseoften differsbecause voters have less chance to express their preferences;localcouncilsare as oftenappointedas elected,
and the chief administrator of the city maybe a central
government employeewith substantial autonomy. In
addition, local governmentfinancial autonomyis quite
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restricted. For instance, it is common for the central
govemmentto placetight controls on localgovemment
tax rate changesand borrowingpracticesand to impose
constrainingmandatesfor servicelevels.Althoughlocal
fiscal choices in developing countries are more constrained, however, they are by no means nonexistent.
Manylocal councils and mayors are elected; the composition of centrally appointed local councils often
reflectslocalpoliticalconsiderations;and appointedcity
managers do attempt to take local preferences into
account. Even in the most centrally planned and centrally controlled developingcountries, the public protests high bus faresor water rates, sometimeseffectively
resists tax rate increases,and often demandsincreased
public services.
All of this impliesthat a more constrainedversion of
the traditional maximizationmodel would be relevant
for developingcountries. Tothis end it seemsnecessary
to explainthe determinantsof urban govemmentspending levels in terms of demand-relatedor need-related
factors, cost factors, and the capacityto finance.
Demand or Need Factors
The demand for local public goods is determined by
relativeprices,incomes,needs,and taste factors.Tastes,
or preferences,affect the rate at which consumers are
willingto substitute private for public goods.For example, changing preferencesmay reflect the demand for
better educationalservicesbyfamilieswhoseincomehas
risen abovesubsistencelevels,changing societalvalues
such as substitution of welfareand housing servicesfor
the extended family structure, the demand for more
redistributiveactionsto prevent unrest,2 andwillingness
to pay more taxes in return for govemmentalaction to
offsetnegativeextemalitiesthat result fromthe growing
underprovision of urban public services.
Needs. An important consequenceof urbanizationis
that public service requirements change and decisionmakers mayhaveto interferewith or overrideindividual
preferencesin providingthem. The continuingincrease
in the numbers of the urban poor calls for increased
social and economicservicesand perhapsfor a different
packageof public services-for example,servicedsites
rather than permanent housing, small health clinics
rather than hospital additions,more standposts rather
than water main extensions, and the like.
The growth in the need for public services is most
often associated with increasing population. Some
would argue that expendituresmust increaseat least in
proportion to population to maintain even a constant
per capita level of service (equation 10-1). For example,

water system expansionsmay involveincreasing mar-

ginal costs because of the greater depth required for
tubewells or the greater distance to a catchment area.
Urban population growth rates in developingcountries
tend to lie considerably above national population
growth rates (table 10-1).Moreover,in some developing
countries the rates ofgrowth of the largest citiestend to
be even higher than the growth of the total urban
population.
Income Effects. The positiveand strong relation betweenurbanizationand per capita incomein developing
countries has been well establishedin two respects:the
Table 10-1. Urbanizationin Selected Developing
Countries, 1960-80

Country

Lowincome'
India
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Tanzania
Zaire
Indonesia
Sudan
Middleincomeb
Kenya
Ghana

Percentof
Urbanpopulation
urban population
as percentof
in largestcity
total population
1960 1980
1960 1980

15
18
18
22
5

16
15
10
37

17
22
27
28
12

11
7
28
20
34

13
6
16
21
50

34

14

28

20
25
50

20
30
28

23
31
29

7

14

40

57

23

36

25

35

Egypt

38

45

38

Zambia
Thailand
Philippines
PNera
Colombia
Coted'lvoire
Tunisia
Jamaica
Malaysia
Korea,Rep.of
Algeria
Mexico
Chile
Brazil
Iran
Argentina
Venezuela

23
13
30
436
48
19
36

38
14
36
67
70
38
52
50
29

n.a.
65
27
38
17
27
40

39
35

19

69
30
397
26
34
30
66
27

55
44

35
27

41
12

67
80
65

28
38
14

32

83

26

26

34

25
28
30
51
68
46
34
74

67

50
82

77

26
46

44

16
28
45

orderof per capita GNP.
Note: Countriesare listedin ascending
countriesgivenin World
a. Weightedaveragefor all low-income
Bank(1981).
countriesgiveninWorld
averageforallmiddle-income
b. Weighted
Bank (1981).
Source: WorldBank(1981).
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more urbanizeddevelopingcountriestend to havehigher per capita incomes (Beier and others 1975;Renaud
1981;Smith 1974),and per capita incomein the largest
cities tends to be the highestin the country (Linn 1982).
There is less objectiveevidenceon the relation between
the increasein urban populationand the increasein per
capita income in urban areas.
Increasingper capitaincome tendsto increasethe per
capita demand for services (q); the magnitude of the
increase is dependent on the income elasticityof demand for locallyprovidedservices.Positiveincome elasticities for urban serviceshave been observedfor water
supply, electricity, telephone service, and solid waste
disposal services (Linn 1982). These higher levels of
consumptionof utilities may be largely attributable to
increasedownershipof appliancesthat use water, electricity, or both (washingmachines, radios, televisions,
and the like), while the increased need for solid waste
disposalmay be associatedwith generallyhigher consumption levels and reduced recyclingin the home.
The demand for motor vehicles is highly incomeelastic,which impliesthat the demandfor urban highway infrastructure is positivelyrelated to per capita
income.3 The demand for schooling is strongly correlated with household income, since the lower the incomethe more likelyit is that childrenwillbe forcedto
drop out of schoolto seekemployment(Beierand others
1975),and the less able are householdsto bear out-ofpocket expenditures for education (Meerman 1979).
Similarly, the demand for health care increaseswith
incomes,with better education,andwith risingfamiliarity with modern health care techniques.
Per capita income increasesalso result in a demand
for a higher quality of urban services. Higher quality
maymean individualrather than communalwater sup4 reducedrisk of electric outply and sanitary facilities,
ages, more rapid communication and transport, and
better health care, education,and fireand policeprotection.
Expectations and Demonstration Effects. Changing
expectations regarding appropriate service levels and
qualityalsoincreasethe demandfor urban services.This
is especiallytrue for water- and electricity-usingappliances,motor vehicles,and educationalachievement
and therefore for the deriveddemand for such related
urban servicesas public utilities,road construction,and
education. The demand for public servicesmay alsobe
heavilyinfluencedbya demonstrationeffectfrom more
developed countries. As a result, developing-country
governmentshavefrequentlyraised standardsrapidlyto
attempt to attain the levels of quality and technology
found elsewhere. Examples are the often unchecked
growth of privateautomobileownership,high use ofand

127

high quality standards for water supply, water-borne
seweragetechnologies to replace such traditional disposal techniquesas night-soil collection,and construction of incineratorsor compostingplants forsolid waste
disposal to replaceconventional recyclingtechniques.
Allthese can result in significant increasesin expenditure requirements (Linn 1982).
Migration and Poverty. Increasedlocal government
expendituresalsoresult from the locationaldecisionsof
poor migrants, who typicallyswell the populations of
cities in developingcountries. Often these migrants
squat on or purchase at cheap prices land that is difficult to service owing to topography (mountainsides,
swamps, flood areas, and so on). As these settlements
become relativelywell established, the need to service
them increasinglybecomesa politicaland humanitarian
necessityfor urban governments,and the result is substantial expenditurerequirements.

Cost Factors
Localgovernmentexpendituresmayalsorise because
the cost of providinga given quantity of public services
rises-that is, because of an increase in ei. Increasing
factorcosts, particularlyfor labor,are a prime reasonfor
increasesin localgovernmentexpenditures.Conversely,
local government unit costs may fall as population increasesif there are economiesof scalein the provisionof
urban public services.
Unit Cost of Inputs. Probably the principal factor
responsiblefor unit cost increases is inflation.To the
extentthat developingcountries are plaguedwith higher
levels of price inflation than are industrial countries,
local government costs in developingcountries will increase more rapidlythan those in industrial countries.
General inflation can lead to increasingper capita expenditures but does not explainan increasingshare of
local government expenditure in income. There are,
however,factorsthat tend to raise urban public service
input costs more rapidlythan the general inflationrate.
First, the provisionof publicutility servicesfrequently requires investment outlays on a large scale. Urban
governments therefore have to rely on foreign credits
from international agencies, from the international
capital market, or from suppliers.As is well-known,the
supplycurve forfunds is upwardsloping,and largecities
are likelyto run into increasing costs of capital unless
the central government is the primary borrower and
passes on the loan funds at subsidizedrates to urban
governments. The extent and terms of borrowing by
urban governmentsare almost alwayscontrolled bythe
central government, and thus the costof capital as it is
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passed on to local authorities is effectivelya policy instrument of the central government.The rising cost of
capital is reflected ultimately in the public sector as a
financial cost, whether at the national or at the local
level,and thus the large capital-intensiveinfrastructure
works required by rapid urbanization maywell involve
higher-than-averageinterest rates.
Second,the averagecostof publicemployeesmayalso
be affected by urbanization, although the direction of
this effect is not completelyclear. If workers become
more productive as city size increases, and if private
sector wages respondto productivityincreases,there is
some possibilityfor a wage rollout to the public sector.
This suggestsincreasingpublic sectorwages during the
urbanizationprocess.Yetthe extent to which the competitive wage thesis holds depends on the rate of inmigration and, other things being equal, a greater rate
of in-migrationwill dampenthe wagerollout effect.The
local publicsector, as part of the general servicessector,
is labor-intensiveand does not require a skilledwork
force. Newly arrived migrants swell the numbers of
unskilledworkersavailableand hold downthe wage rate
in the services sector.
It may also be argued that wage rates increase more
rapidlythan does the generalprice level,owingto institutional factorsthat determinethe wagesand salariesof
localgovernmentemployees.Laborunions forlocal civil
servants exist in some countries and can be extremely
vocalin pressing for higher wages.5 In other caseslocal
government salaries and wages are determined by the
central govemment. Since it frequentlydoes not bear
the brunt of localgovernmentsalaryreadjustments,the
central government may be quite willing to raise local
civilservicesalariesmore rapidlythan the general price
level.6
Third, land prices are also likelyto rise more rapidly
than the general price level in cities as a result of rapid
urban population growth, increased density, and the
resulting scarcity of serviced urban land. Rising land
prices tend to have particularlystrong impacts on the
unit costs of services that are relativelyland-intensive,
such as the transport sector-which requires substantial amounts of urban land for streets and sidewalksparks and recreation, schools,and solid waste disposal.
Finally,the unit costof energyhas risen more rapidly
than the generalprice leveland maywell continueto do
so. This can burden larger local governmentsthat tend
to rely more heavilyon the use of motor vehicles for
provisionof servicesand on the use of electricity-for
instance for street lighting and for the pumping and
treatment of potablewater and of sewage.
Confirmationof the hypothesisthat input prices tend
to increasewith the populationsize of cities is found in
frequent observationsof price levelsthat are higher in

larger cities than in rural areas, although these differences are rarely measured accurately.Thomas (1978)
found that in Peru the average cost of livingin Lima
exceededthat in rural areas by a substantial margin.
This may be largely explainedby differentiallyhigher
input prices in Lima, compared with the rest of the
country. A similar conclusionfor Brazilis presentedby
Thomas (1982).
Technological Progress and Economies of Scale.
Technological progress should reduce input requirementsper unit of publicoutput and therebyreduce
unit cost (ei). It is generallyrecognized,however, that
technological progress in most public services is slow
(Baumol 1967) and that some technological advances
may lead developingcountries to adopt modern technologies which are inefficient and excessivelycostly.
Examplesare composterfacilitiesfor solidwaste disposal, waterborne seweragesystemsand treatment plants,
limited-accessrapid speedhighways,subways,and possibly even premature computerization.
Technologicaleconomiesof scalemay also implydeclining unit costduring urbanization.Adetailedstudyof
engineering costs for certain urban services in India
appears to support this hypothesis (Stanford Research
Institute 1968).Similarly,a study of water supplycosts
for small and intermediate-sizecities in Colombiahas
shown declining unit costs (Insfopal1975),which are
probably largely attributable to economies of scale.
These economies of scale, however, are likely to be
limited to public utilities, and it is not even clear
whether governments in rapidly growing urban areas
are alwaysin a position to benefit from them. Moreover,
economies of scale may be offset by diseconomiesof
agglomeration, particularly in larger, denser urban
areas. Diseconomies result from congestion, which
tends to increase with city size and is especiallyproblematicin transport. Diseconomiesmayalsoresult from
limits in the carrying capacityof the natural environment (examplesare air and water pollution) and from
the increasingscarcity of natural resources, especially
water and energy. Other examples are the increased
need for diseasecontrol and fire and policeprotection
which are associatedwith the largescaleandhigh density of urban living. In all casessome inputs (space,natural resources, and so on) grow scarce as urbanization
proceeds, and larger amounts of other inputs (labor,
capital, and intermediate inputs, in particular) haveto
be applied to maintain servicelevels and provideclean
water andair, goodhealth care, anda safeenvironment.
Public Service Employment. Cost increases for
urban servicesmay result iflocal government is viewed
as an employerof last resort. Overstaffingof local gov-
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ernment officesis typical, and as a result the financial

costs of urban services are inflated. Whether this is
desirableas a matter of policy dependson the tradeoff
betweenthe gains from additionalemployment,oftenat
low economiccosts (becauseof widespreadunemployment or underemploymentof skilled and semiskilled
labor), and the financial impact of such a policy.

Revenue Constraints and Opportunities
Urbanizationmost often puts pressure on local government budgets by driving up expenditures; at the
same time revenues mayrise by less than a commensurate amount. Followingequation 10-4, total revenues
availableto finance the growing expenditurerequirements of cities may be separatedinto tax revenues(T),
other current revenues,including user charges(C),and
external funding (G).
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rate ceiling is usually higher for larger cities. Thus,
urbanizationmay givea substantial boost to local government tax revenuesthrough increasesin the valuesof
Y, P, rj, and tj.
This favorableimpact on local governmentrevenues
can, however,be offsetby important constraints. Local
governmentsmay havelittle opportunityto capture the
increases in taxablecapacity associatedwith urbanization. For example,the central government fixesBj by
specifyingthe tax bases availableto local governments;
t1, the tax rate, is commonlyfixed by the central government; and in some cases even tax collection,rj, is
largelya centralgovernmentmatter. In sum, there is no
correspondencebetween the expectedincreases in expenditures and in revenues in response to a given increase in urbanization.The resulting gap or deficitwill
vary from place to place and will dependon the public
serviceresponsibilitiesand discretionaryfiscalpowersof
local governments.
User Charges

tares
Total tax revenuesof an urban governmentare determined by a set of factorswhich may be summarizedin
the definitionalidentity
(10-6)

T = E ( Ti j

-L
1B

pj P)= rj tj1byP

1YP

where
T
Tj
Lj
Bj
Y
rj

= total tax revenue
= tax revenue of taxj
= legal tax liabilityof tax] for given tax statutes
= base of tax]
= total personal income
= collectionrate
tj = legal tax rate
bj = base to income ratio
y = per capita income
P = population

Consideringthe rapid growth in populationand income and the relatively high per capita income levels
associatedwith urban growth, the processof urbanization should and does providea relativelystrong taxable
capacity for urban governments.Not only do increased
population, income, and motorization represent a
strong economic base (in relation to the rest of the
country), but larger cities also have the potential for
more efficientcollection.Urbanlocalgovernmentshave
a better professionalexpertisethan other local governments, and urbanizationbrings growingformalemployment, more cars, and increased property values-all
readilyidentifiabletax handles.Finally,the statutorytax

The revenues generated by user charges (C) may be
represented as
C Q
(10-7)
C
t(c q1 P)
___

whereCi is user chargescollectedfor urban servicei, Qi
is the quantity of service i consumed, ci is the unit
charge for servicei, and qi is the quantity of servicei
providedper capita.
In contrast to urban taxes, user charges for services
show a direct link between the quantityof servicesprovided and the revenuesgenerated to finance those services.The extent to which user chargescoverthe costof
provision of services depends, however, on how the
average price charged, ci, compareswith the average
cost of providingservice,e,.
The evidenceon the relations between city size and
the cilei ratio is mixed. On the one hand, autonomous
public utilityagenciesin largecities seemable to charge
high enough rates to cover increasing marginal costs
and sometimes to generate a surplus. The same result
seems to hold for special assessmentson urban landowners, for example,in Korea (Doebele 1979)and Colombia (Doebele,Grimes,and Linn 1979).Urbanization
thus seems to create a demandfor these servicesand a
capacity to pay full costs. On the other hand, some
services(notablytransport andhousing) donot generate
enough revenue from charges to cover their full costs.
The problem here is that urbanizationalso generates a
great many social costs, such as congestionand pollution, and povertyproblems that may dictate holding c1
belowei.
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External Funds
Grants and loans(G)are not underthe controlof local
authorities but dependon the decisionsof higher-level
authorities. Whether urbanization brings more grant
assistance to local governments depends on how the
revenuesharing system operates.For example,if grants
are distributedaccordingto populationor on the basisof
localtax collections,as in a sharedtax,urbanizationmay
generate an increasedinflowof externalresources. The
same maybe true ifgrantsare madeon a cost reimbursement basis.
In the functionalrelation G = G(P,Y, Qi),onewould
usually expect to find partial derivatives such that
dGIdP 2 0, dGIdY $ 0, and dGldQi Ž 0.
In other words, grants tend to vary directlywith city
population size and with the amount of services provided under a system of per capita or cost reimbursement grants. External resource flowsmay increase or
decreasein responseto increasesin per capitaincomein
the city, dependingon the grant system. A tax sharing
scheme will channel more funds to cities as urbanization proceeds,whereas a formulathat equalizesgrants
across jurisdictions may have the opposite effect.
Policy Options for Urban Fiscal Reform
It may be concludedwith some certainty that public
expenditurerequirementsincreasewith urbanizationin
absolute terms and probablyalso in per capita terms.
Most often, urbanization also enhances the revenue
capacityof urban governments, but revenuegrowth in
most cities has been hampered by the limited revenue
authority granted to local governments and by their
poor revenueefforts.Asa result, revenueshavenot kept
pace with expenditureneeds, and service deficits have
resulted. There is little reason to expectthat this situation will change significantlyin the future.
This conclusion raisesthe questionof the constraints
on reform.In principle,an urban fiscalgap can be closed
in four ways: increased local revenue effort with unchanged revenueauthority, increasedlocal revenueauthority, increased transfers from higher-levelgovernment, or reduced responsibilityfor expenditures.With
these alternativesin mind, the reform questionmay be
addressedbyfocusingseparatelyon the expenditureand
revenue sides of the budget and by noting important
interrelations between the two sides.
The Reassignment of Functions
A common response of higher-levelgovernmentsto
city fiscal crises has been to assume responsibilityfor

certain urban services such as public utilities, roads,
education, and health. In addition to arguments of relieving financial pressures, efficiencyand distributive
concerns are often cited as justificationsfor such reassignment. Because of the difficultiesof measuring the
efficiencyand equity gains, however, it is difficult to
justify such proposals.In any case,two important considerations weigh heavily against this approach to resolvingurban fiscalproblems.First, the transfer of specific functions to higher-levelgovernment reduces the
localauthority's potentialforrespondingto urban policy
issues and problems.This is undesirablebecausemany
urban developmentactivities are interrelated and require an integrated approach to planning and implementation, and local authorities are often better
equipped to provide such planning than are national
ministries or special-purposeagencies.Second,national
governments often assume only the responsibilityfor
making capital investments and leave it to the local
authorities to operate and maintain the facilities.This
turnkey approachtends to burden localauthoritieswith
facilitiesthat are often beyondtheir financialand technical capacityto operate and maintain and that maynot
reflect local preferences.
IncreasedLocal Taxes
The judgment about which taxes are most appropriatelyallocatedto local authorities dependsin part on
the perspectiveof the decisionmaker.From the central
government'sperspectivethe main goalsare to (1)limit
local competition for the important national tax bases
(broad-basedwealth, income, and expendituretaxes);
(2)limit the localuse of taxesthat are mainlyexportedto
other jurisdictions; (3) provide local authorities with a
reasonablybuoyantrevenuebase;(4)avoidlocalreliance
on regressivetaxes; (5) encouragethe use of taxes that
are most easily administered at the local level; and (6)
encourage the use of taxes which are closelylinked to
urban infrastructure and congestion costs, to internalize some of the externalitiesin the urban economy.
From the local perspective,criteria 3, 4, 5, and 6 are
likelyto be equallyrelevant, although they mayvary in
strength. For example,local governmentsare likelyto
placea greater emphasisthan higher-levelgovernments
on buoyancy and administrative ease and perhaps a
differentemphasison equity and efficiency.Asregards
criteria 1 and 2-competition with national tax bases
and nonexport of revenues-local authorities are likely
to have priorities exactly oppositeto those of higherlevelgovernment.Sincethe broad-basedtaxestend to be
the more buoyant, and the most easily tapped, local
governmentsdesire access to them. Reliance on taxes
which can be shifted to taxpayersoutside the jurisdic-
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tion will naturally also be politicallyattractive to local
govemments.
Giventhese sometimescontradictorygoals,it appears
that the property and motor vehicle taxes are, on balance, the most desirableand least objectionableof the
major tax instruments that could be delegatedto local
jurisdictions. From the central perspective,they do not
compete substantially with national taxes, and tax exporting is likely to be limited, particularly for large
cities.7 From the local perspective,too, these taxes are
largely appropriate. Local access to broad-basedconsumption, income, and wealth taxes is generally not
granted by national governments-a reflectionof the
overriding influenceof central government objectives.
Exportabletaxes,such as selectiveexcisetaxes,octroi (a
tax on goods brought into a town), and tourism and
hotel taxes,are popularamonglocalauthoritiesbut tend
to receiveonly mixedblessingsfrom the central authorities or to be prohibited.They are sometimestolerated
mainly becausethey reduce local govemments' claims
on national tax resources.
The empirical evidenceon the actual use of taxes by
local governmentsin the cities of developingcountries
is fullycompatiblewith the gist of this discussion(Bahl,
Holland,and Linn 1982).The practicaldifficultyis that
the scopefor transferring additionaltaxing authorityto
local governments may be severely circumscribedby
national economic developmentpolicies.Rather than
expectthe allocationofnew revenueauthority, it maybe
more realistic to argue for reducedcentral government
limitationson the use of taxes alreadycollectedbylocal
govemments. Such policies, together with local measures for the improvementof localtax effort,willpermit
local government to better reach the growth in taxable
capacity that comeswith increasedurbanization.
User Charges
From the national perspective,an effectivelyadministered set of user charges would seem to be the most
appropriate source of local government revenue. User
charges do not competewith central governmentrevenue bases; they are largely nonexportable;they can
have desirable revenue, efficiency,and equity characteristics; and they are administrativelyfeasibleat the
local level. It may therefore come as a surprise that
national govemments have sometimes counteracted
localauthorities' intentionsto mobilizemore resources
through increases in user charges. There are two
reasons for these interventions: national governments
are concemed about inflation and want to limit the
impact of rising local public service charges, and they
fear the political repercussionsof price increases for
urban services,since urban consumers are often quite
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emphatic in their oppositionto increases and at times
even endanger the political stability of the country
through riots and the like. Localauthorities also have
mixed attitudes about raising user fees, partly for the
same politicalreasonsthat concem the national government and partly becausethey may havecometo rely on
central govemmenttransfersto financesignificantportions of their public service investments.
On balance, however, it appears that local service
charges havebecomeincreasinglyimportantsources of
additional revenue, particularlyin cities in which local
authorities providepublicutility services.In many cases
user charges have been utilized effectivelyby local authorities in lieu of alternativerevenuesourcesand have
contributedto the general financingof the local government. It is in the area of user charges that judicious
support by central authorities for local revenue raising
efforts, in place of the frequentlypracticedobstructionism, maybe most productivein closingthe urban fiscal
gap.
,
Grants
Anincreasein fiscaltransfersfrom the centralto local
govemments is another means of comingto grips with
the urban fiscalgap. Thereare a number ofgoodreasons
for developinga system of revenue sharing between
different levelsof govemment: the greater administrative efficiencyof collectingtaxes centrally,the need for
the central govemmentto work to equalizethe revenues
of local governments, and-the traditional justification-the need to provide incentives for efficientlocal
govemment decisionson resource allocation.For large
cities, however, it is unrealistic and inappropriate to
expect that transfers will reliably and permanently fill
the fiscalgap. Thepressureson the central fisctend to be
such that transfersto local authoritiesare the firstto be
cut when national austerityprogramsare implemented.
The Politics and Prospects
of Urban Fiscal Reform
Reform proposals to alleviatethe fiscalproblems of
urban govemments are commonplace.Although the
nature of these proposalshas variedfrom place to place,
in line with localconditionsand with the makeupof the
study team, it is clear from a reviewof the evidenceon
urban public financereform that the proposalshavefar
outnumbered the reforms.8 Major local government
fiscalreforms in the last twentyyears have taken place
mainly in the industrial countries. Examplesare Germany (consolidationof communes and reform of revenue sharing arrangements),Sweden(consolidationof

132

Roy Bahl and JohannesLinn

communes), and the United States (reform of revenue
sharing arrangements). Among the developingcountries the rule would seem to be that changes in urban
finance arrangementscome slowlyand that it may take
decadesfor fundamental changes to take place, if they
occur at all.
Typical for the developingcountries are minor and
slowadjustments in urban financepractices,such as the
creationof special districtsfor capital citieswith special
expenditureresponsibilitiesand revenueauthority (for
example,Manilaand Seoul), enlargementof metropolitan jurisdictions by annexationof adjacent municipalities (as in Bogota),gradualdevelopmentof new revenue
sources (for example, betterment levies in Colombian
cities, land readjustment schemesin Korea,and vehicle
taxation in Jakarta), gradual reform of existingrevenue
sources (propertytaxation in Jakarta and Manila),reassignments of expenditure functions (Kenyaand Zambia),and similar gradual and ad hoc responsesto urban
fiscalpressures.Majorreformproposalshaveoften been
shelvedor taken up only in very minor respects-examplesare local governmentreform proposalsin India and
property tax reform in Jakarta. Where major readjustments in the fiscalstructure ofurban governmentshave
occurred, it was where higher-levelgovernmentstook
over important revenue sources previouslyallocatedto
local authorities (Kenyaand Iran), where sweepingpoliticalchanges resultedin major shiftsof national policy
priorities(Nigeria,Tanzania,and Uganda),or where the
fiscal problems became so unmanageable that some
drastic reformwasunavoidable(removalof most important expenditureresponsibilitiesfrom rural and smalltown councilsin Kenya).Thelessonsfrom the history of
urban fiscal reform proposals and implementationare
that major proposalsrarely have a chance of adoption
and implementationand that gradual, stepwiseadjustments of the existingstructure toward a more desirable
state are all that can be hopedfor. Gradualadjustments
may, in fact, have a better chance of eventual implementation.
There are three major reasonsfor the inertia typically
found in the face of the need for urban public finance
reform. First, policymakersand citizensshare an antipathy to the uncertain effects of untested large-scale
changes in the economic environment. Second, most
major reforms are associatedwith substantial windfall
losses to relativelyfew among the urban populationmostly among the elites-whereas windfall gains are
likely to be spread over a much larger number of people-mostly the less well-off.Third, although there has
been a growing concern in developingcountries about
how to strengthen the capabilityof urban govemments
to cometo gripswith their tasks,progresshas tended to
become bogged down in a three-waydebate over the
fiscal decentralization issue that typicallyinvolvesthe

ministry of finance, the ministry of local government,
and the city governments.
The ministryoffinance,whichusuallyis the strongest
party, tends to argue in favorof the status quo. It generally refuses to relinquish control over major tax sources
or borrowing and argues that decentralizationwould
compromise the central government's important fiscal
and tax policyprograms. On the expenditure side, the
ministry offinancewould rather emphasizecentral govemient projects and priorities and is often suspicious
of the ability of the ministry of local government to
regulate the fiscal operations of local governments. It
will agree to a grant system but wouldprefer the grant
pool to be decidedon a year-by-yearbasis rather than
take the form of a shared tax. In general, the finance
ministry lookson local governmentsas junior partners
in the fiscal process, is doubtful about their management and tax collectionabilities,and feelsthat they can
get much more out of their existingrevenueauthorities
without recourse to new sources of revenue.
The ministryof localgovernment-in somecountries
the ministry of the interior-is usually less influential
than the financeministryand is oftenless wellstaffed.It
usually argues for an extensive grant system and for
other regulatory mechanisms which allow a greater
measure of control over local government finances. It
wouldprefer that the total grant pool be determinedas a
fixedshare of somenational tax and that the distribution
of some or all of these grants be at its discretion.Such a
scheme would at the same time limit the susceptibility
of the grant systemto changingfinanceministry budget
prioritiesand maximizethe extent of the control of the
ministry of local government over local authorities.
Administrationsof large cities would prefer more independent taxing power and less central regulation of
their finances. If there is a grant system, a shared tax
basedon originof collectionwouldbe the preferredform
and a grant pool determinedby the financeministryand
allocatedby the ministry of localgovernmentwould be
less preferable.
The sense of competition, the suspicion,and the lack
of mutual confidencethat frequentlycharacterize the
debate between national and local government authorities in developingcountries have constantly compromised the potential for success of virtually any farreaching urban government reform. If reforms are to
succeed, a mutuallysupportivesystem of local and central government relations must be established.
Notes
1. Perhapsthe best comparablefiscaldata availablefor
countriesarethosereportedin InternationalMondeveloping
etaryFund,GovernmentFinancialStatistics. Even this year-
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book is more complete for the central governmentthan for
local governments;in manycases,localgovernmentactivityis
not reported at all.
2. It might be argued that utility functionsbecomemore
strongly interdependent during the developmentprocess, at
least partlybecause there is more to protectfrom the dangers
of civilunrest. For the basicmodelsee Hochmanand Rodgers
(1969).
3. See Smith (1974)for evidencethat the densityof automobile ownership is much higher in the major cities of developing countries than in each country as a whole. Furthermore, Smith and Kim (1979) show that the density of
automobileownershipis higher in Seouland Pusanthan in the
intermediate-sizecities of Korea. Datain World Bank(1975)
also indicate a positiveassociationbetweenautomobileownership and per capita income for a cross-sectionof cities in
developingcountries (seeLinn 1983, ch. 4).
4. Note, for instance, that in the higher-income Latin
Americancountries communalfacilitiesare generallyrejected
by the population, whereas they have found acceptancein
lower-incomeAsian and Africancountries.
5. In Colombia,for instance, localteachersand health service personnelwere extremelyactive in the 1970sin pushing
for higherwages;theyresortedto strikes,protestmarches,and
sit-ins at the municipaloffices.
6. Agood exampleis Korea,wherethe central government
raised local governmentwages and salariesby 20 percent in
1975and by a further 30 percent in 1976,both times significantlyabovethe generalinflationlevel(Smithand Kim,1979).
Other examplesof centrallydecreedsalaryincreasesfor local
officialshaveoccurred, for example,in Kenya,Turkey,India,
and Pakistan. In Pakistan, however,the central government
offsetthe increasedexpenditurerequirementsby providinga
specialgrant to local authorities.Also,there are documented
in
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have increased less rapidly
examples examples
in which
local salaries
than the general price level, as in the case of municipal
teachersin Bogota,wheresalaries,adjustedfor increasesin the
price level, declinedbetween1971 and 1973.
7. Note, however,that oppositionfrom groups that are
influentialin nationalgovernmentcircleshas been knownto
hamperthe developmentof effectivepropertyand motorvehicle taxationbecause of its progressiveimpact,which tends to
be bome by preciselythese groups.
8. Walsh (1969);Robsonand Regan (1972).
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